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Rorty and pragmatic social criticism

Department of Philosophy, University College London, London, UK

For pragmatists, the inability to stand outside of the contingencies of human practice does not impede social criticism. However, several pragmatists have argued that Richard Rorty’s position unnecessarily and undesirably circumscribes the scope of social criticism, allowing for nothing more than an appeal to current practices, with no way to challenge or revise them. This article argues against this understanding, showing that on Rorty’s account, social criticism is an interpretive activity in which critics draw on elements within current practices, focusing attention on the ways in which a society’s practices fail to live up to its self-image. In so doing, Rorty’s position is shown to allow for everything that his fellow pragmatists think important, but take him to be denying.

Key Words: conversation • pragmatism • reflective equilibrium • Richard Rorty • social criticism

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 32, No. 7, 863-880 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/0191453706066978


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