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From pragmatism to perfectionism

Cheryl Misak's epistemic deliberativism

Philosophy Department, Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, USA

In recent work, Cheryl Misak has developed a novel justification of deliberative democracy rooted in Peircean epistemology. In this article, the author expands Misak's arguments to show that not only does Peircean pragmatism provide a justification for deliberative democracy that is more compelling than the justifications offered by competing liberal and discursivist views, but also fixes a specific conception of deliberative politics that is perfectionist rather than neutralist. The article concludes with a discussion of whether the `epistemic perfectionism' implied by the pragmatist argument could be endorsed by liberal democrats.

Key Words: deliberative democracy • epistemology • liberalism • Cheryl Misak • Charles Peirce • perfectionism • pragmatism • truth

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 33, No. 3, 387-406 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0191453707076145


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