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Harry Frankfurt's metaphysics of care

Towards an ethics without reason

University of Picardie Jules Verne, France

Harry Frankfurt's conception of care and love has largely been considered a seductive theory of personality, but an untenable and irresponsible theory of moral normativity. Contrary to that interpretation, this article aims at showing that it is possible to remain faithful to Frankfurt's metaphysical premises while not falling into some moral relativism. First, by comparing Frankfurt's and Heidegger's conceptions of care, I show that Frankfurt's subordination of ethics to carology apparently commits him to a neutral foundationalism. In the next step, I argue that his calling into question of the relation between rationality and morality does indeed subject moral normativity to some subjective and contingent limits. And finally, I show that the objections raised against such a conclusion can be answered by shifting Frankfurt's frontier between contingency and necessity and by exploiting his concept of wholeheartedness.

Key Words: Hannah Arendt • care • John Dewey • evil • finitude • Harry Frankfurt • Martin Heidegger • importance • love • moral normativity • necessity • personality • rationality

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 34, No. 7, 759-797 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0191453708093085


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