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Berlin, value pluralism and the common good

A reply to Brian Trainor

School of Political and International Studies, Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia

Brian Trainor argues that the current hostility of political theorists towards the idea of the common good is in part due to the influence of Isaiah Berlin's concept of `value pluralism', or the incommensurability of basic human values. I agree with Trainor's opposition to the `agonistic' interpretation of pluralism, associated with thinkers like Chantal Mouffe. However, it is not the case that the only alternative to the pluralism— agonism thesis is the monist defence of a thick common good advocated by Trainor. Between these extremes there is a middle way that accepts the deep plurality of values in Berlin's sense, but recognizes a case for a thin conception of the common good — that is, a liberal political framework.

Key Words: Isaiah Berlin • common good • incommensurability • monism • value pluralism

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 34, No. 8, 925-939 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0191453708094730


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