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On the circularity of democratic justice

University of the West of England, UK

In this article, I argue that justice and democracy stand in a circular relationship: just outcomes emerge from democratic deliberations, but only if such deliberations meet the standards of justice. I develop my argument by engaging in a critical dialogue with Nancy Fraser. Contending that she fails to deal with the danger that unfair deliberative procedures and inadequate norms of justice may reinforce one another, I show what a satisfactory account of democratic justice would look like. Going beyond Fraser’s theory, I maintain that although justice and democracy do form a circular relationship, it is essential to give the former greater weight than the latter. I finesse my account by showing what this differential weighting would entail in practice. The result is an account of democratic justice that is significantly different from and a marked improvement on that of Fraser.

Key Words: democracy • Nancy Fraser • good enough deliberation • justice • parity of participation

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol. 35, No. 9, 1079-1098 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0191453709343391


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