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<prism:coverDisplayDate>November 2009</prism:coverDisplayDate>
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<title>Philosophy &amp; Social Criticism</title>
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<title><![CDATA[1989 and the European Social Model: Transition without emancipation?]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1019?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The post-communist revolutions of 1989 triggered parallel transformation in the ideological landscape on both sides of the former Iron Curtain. The geo-political opening after the end of the Cold War made global integration a highly salient factor in political mobilization, opting out to replace the capital-versus-labor dynamics of conflict that had shaped the ideological families of Europe during the 20th century. This has resulted in splitting the traditional constituencies of the Left and the Right and reorganizing them along new fault-lines: those shaped by attitudes to globalization and EU enlargement (in the West) and by attitudes to EU accession and global economic competition (in the East). Thus, an ideational convergence between East and West is taking place in Europe, radically altering the structure of political competition in the early 21st century. As the new political cleavage cuts across, rather than runs along, the left&mdash;right ideological continuum, it is eroding the societal alliances that had supported the post-war European Social Model. The emerging structure of political competition enables substantive changes in the European Social Model in the direction of deepening labor commodification, thus defeating the emancipatory potential that earlier labor-market policies had contained.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Azmanova, A.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709343384</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[1989 and the European Social Model: Transition without emancipation?]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1037</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1019</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1039?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[What is wrong with agonistic pluralism?: Reflections on conflict in democratic theory]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1039?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>During the last couple of decades, concurrently with an increased awareness of the complexity of ethical conflicts, political theorists have directed attention to how constitutional democracy should cope with a fact of incommensurable doctrines. Poststructuralists such as Chantal Mouffe claim that ethical conflicts are fundamentally irreconcilable, which is indeed a view shared by many liberal theorists. The question of whether ethical conflicts are <I>in principle</I> irreconcilable is an important one since the answer has implications for what democratic institutions are desirable. In light of this question the article investigates the notion of conflict in agonistic pluralism and discourse theory. At first glance, Mouffe&rsquo;s agonism seems apt to accommodate ethical conflict in democratic governance, since it focuses on conflict as the core of politics, whereas Habermasian deliberative democracy seems inappropriate for this task, as it focuses on consensus. However, through an inquiry into the conditions of conflict this article will argue the opposite, namely, that conflict cannot be adequately understood within Mouffe&rsquo;s agonistic framework. The thesis defended is (1) that discourse theory offers a more accurate account of conflict than agonistic theory because it embraces the idea that deliberation is constitutive of conflict, and (2) that some of Habermas&rsquo; assumptions concerning ethical discourse need to be revised in order for his democratic theory to fully accommodate this insight.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Erman, E.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709343385</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[What is wrong with agonistic pluralism?: Reflections on conflict in democratic theory]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1062</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1039</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<title><![CDATA[Ethics versus morality: A problematic divide]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1063?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>I explicate the distinction between ethics and morality in terms of four central contrasts, and argue (1) that moral theories that embrace the implicit divide are both theoretically and practically problematic in their failure to meet certain widely accepted standards of theoretical coherence and in their resulting propensity to generate indeterminable conflicts among norms, and (2) that social roles represent one aspect of the moral life that cannot be understood in terms of this distinction. My suggestion will be that we ought to explore an interpretation of the moral realm according to which all moral attributes are relative to social roles, since a role-centered morality promises a way of overcoming this problematic divide.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Harper, S. J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709343388</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Ethics versus morality: A problematic divide]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1077</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1063</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1079?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[On the circularity of democratic justice]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1079?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In this article, I argue that justice and democracy stand in a circular relationship: just outcomes emerge from democratic deliberations, but only if such deliberations meet the standards of justice. I develop my argument by engaging in a critical dialogue with Nancy Fraser. Contending that she fails to deal with the danger that unfair deliberative procedures and inadequate norms of justice may reinforce one another, I show what a satisfactory account of democratic justice would look like. Going beyond Fraser&rsquo;s theory, I maintain that although justice and democracy do form a circular relationship, it is essential to give the former greater weight than the latter. I finesse my account by showing what this differential weighting would entail in practice. The result is an account of democratic justice that is significantly different from and a marked improvement on that of Fraser.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Thompson, S.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709343391</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[On the circularity of democratic justice]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1098</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1079</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1099?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Reason as danger and remedy for the modern subject in Hobbes' Leviathan]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1099?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The article argues that Hobbes articulates a modern problematic of reason, where the shared rationality of human beings is an integral part of the danger they present to each other, and where reason suggests a solution, the social contract and the laws of nature, enforced and interpreted by absolute sovereign authority. This solution reflects a tension in modern reason itself, since it requires the alienation of self-determination of the rational human subject precisely to preserve the condition for the possibility of the rationality of the rational human subject, i.e. one&rsquo;s life, which is threatened by the very rationality of other human subjects. I discuss interpretations of Hobbes which stress the other motives of conflict, i.e. competition and vanity, and acknowledge that they play a role in the threat subjects present to each other, but argue that the danger presented precisely by shared rationality, which I discuss with some reference to the Hegelian dialectic of consciousness and mutual recognition, has been underplayed by Hobbes&rsquo; interpretation.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sadler, G. B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709340638</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Reason as danger and remedy for the modern subject in Hobbes' Leviathan]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1118</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1099</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/35/9/1119?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Political liberalism and the good life: Fred Dallmayr, In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled Times (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2007)]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/35/9/1119?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rasmussen, D. M.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709343399</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Political liberalism and the good life: Fred Dallmayr, In Search of the Good Life: A Pedagogy for Troubled Times (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2007)]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1125</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1119</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
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<item rdf:about="http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/35/9/1127?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Review of In Search of the Good Life]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/35/9/1127?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Flynn, B.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709343401</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Review of In Search of the Good Life]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1132</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1127</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1133?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA['Sehnsucht Dorthin': A response to Rasmussen and Flynn]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1133?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>In my response I take issue mainly with the conception of &lsquo;political liberalism&rsquo;, as defended by David Rasmussen, and of &lsquo;civic republicanism&rsquo;, as championed by Bernard Flynn. In opposition to the interest-based individualism of the former, and the state-centered conception of the latter, I support the perspective of an ethically sustained and pluralistic democracy, where democratic politics means the open-ended striving for the &lsquo;good life&rsquo; of all people.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dallmayr, F.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709343402</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA['Sehnsucht Dorthin': A response to Rasmussen and Flynn]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1142</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1133</prism:startingPage>
<prism:section>Articles</prism:section>
</item>

<item rdf:about="http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1143?rss=1">
<title><![CDATA[Badiou's ahistorical century: Alain Badiou, The Century, trans., with commentary and notes, Alberto Toscano (USA: Polity Press, 2007), 233 pp. + index]]></title>
<link>http://psc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/35/9/1143?rss=1</link>
<description><![CDATA[<p>This review essay explores Alain Badiou&rsquo;s paradoxical attempt to give a philosophical account of the 20th century (in his text <I>The Century</I> ) which is not understood along the lines of history. As an example of Badiou&rsquo;s project of &lsquo;subtractive formalization&rsquo;, <I>The Century</I> amounts to an essentially ahistorical treatment of a historical period.</p>]]></description>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Bernstein, J.]]></dc:creator>
<dc:date>Mon, 19 Oct 2009 04:22:49 PDT</dc:date>
<dc:identifier>info:doi/10.1177/0191453709343404</dc:identifier>
<dc:title><![CDATA[Badiou's ahistorical century: Alain Badiou, The Century, trans., with commentary and notes, Alberto Toscano (USA: Polity Press, 2007), 233 pp. + index]]></dc:title>
<prism:number>9</prism:number>
<prism:volume>35</prism:volume>
<prism:endingPage>1149</prism:endingPage>
<prism:publicationDate>2009-11-01</prism:publicationDate>
<prism:startingPage>1143</prism:startingPage>
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